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This research explored the inﬂuence of empathic distress on prosocial behavior in a resource
allocation task with children. Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
before engaging in a sticker sharing task; watching either a video of a girl upset that her dog
had gone missing (emotion induction condition), or a video of the same girl preparing for
a yard sale (control condition). In study one, 5–6 year old children in the emotion induction
condition rated the emotional state of both the protagonist and the selfmore negatively, and
also exhibited more prosocial behavior; sharing more in advantageous inequity (AI) trials,
and less often withholding a beneﬁt in disadvantageous inequity trials, than the control
group. Prosocial behavior was signiﬁcantly correlated with ratings of the emotional state
of the protagonist but not with own emotional state, suggesting that empathic concern
rather than personal distress was the primary inﬂuence on prosocial behavior. In study
two, 3-year-olds were tested on AI trials alone, and like the 5 and 6-year-olds, showed
more prosocial behavior in the emotion induction condition than the control.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well established that prosocial behavior such as helping and
sharing emerges early in development (e.g., Rheingold et al., 1976;
Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). A common approach to the
study of sharing is to examine children’s resource allocation to
self and others under various conditions. Preschool aged chil-
dren will share valued resources and before long seek to establish
fair allocations of resources across individuals (Thompson et al.,
1997; Fehr et al., 2008; Brownell et al., 2009; Moore, 2009; Blake
and McAuliffe, 2011). Although we know that preschool children
will share, little is known about the mechanisms underlying such
prosocial behavior (Hepach et al., 2013). By understanding these
mechanisms, it should be possible to support and encourage the
development of these highly valued, and critically important social
behaviors.
Here we examine the role of empathic distress on young chil-
dren’s decisions to allocate resources to another person. It is
important to note that deﬁnitions of empathy in previous research
have varied considerably across laboratories. Generally, however,
empathy is believed to be a complex, and multifaceted con-
struct consisting of a variety of components such as perspective
taking, empathic concern, and personal distress (Davis, 1980).
While empathic concern refers to the individual’s other oriented
feelings of sympathy and concern for someone in distress, per-
sonal distress refers to experiencing unpleasant feelings oneself, in
response to witnessing another in distress (Davis, 1980, 1983).
In the context of this research, by empathic distress, we are
referring to both personal distress and empathic concern. Our
measure of personal distress is children’s own emotional reac-
tions in response to a ﬁctitious character’s situation (i.e., the
tendency to experience the same negative emotion as another who
is observed to be in distress). Our measure of empathic concern
is children’s attributions of emotion to another who is observed
to be in distress, without necessarily experiencing sadness them
selves.
Empathy emerges early on,with infants exhibiting simple forms
of global empathy by responding with reactive or contagious cry-
ing to observed distress in others (Sagi and Hoffman, 1976). At
this young age, however, children lack the ability to differenti-
ate between their own and others feelings (Hoffman, 1975, 1977).
With time, however, children learn to distinguish and separate
their own reactions from another individual’s distress. Around
2 years of age, children begin to develop the ability to under-
stand the emotional states of others, experience and share their
emotions, andmake attempts to alleviate observed distress (Zahn-
Waxler and Radke-Yarrow, 1990). As children continue to develop,
they become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to under-
stand and respond to the psychological states of others (Selman,
1980), and cultivate the ability to empathize with others in a more
complex manner (Hoffman, 1975, 1977).
A large body of research has explored relationships between
empathic distress, and various social behaviors or characteristics,
and results have been mixed, varying in part according to how
empathy and the behaviors or characteristics in question have
been measured (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987). There is, however,
evidence for a relation between empathic distress, or experiencing
concern for others and prosocial behavior in children (e.g., Eisen-
berg et al., 1988; Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow, 1990; Strayer
and Roberts, 1997; Malti et al., 2009; Vaish et al., 2009; see Eisen-
berg et al., 2006 for a review). For example, a relation has been
found between children’s degree of facial sadness while watching
a video of a child falling and hurting themselves, and later sponta-
neous sharing behavior with a partner (Eisenberg et al., 1988). In
one study, empathy was found to be positively related to prosocial
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and social behaviors, and negatively associated with anger and
aggression (Strayer and Roberts, 2004).
Batson et al. (1981) found that, in a sample of undergradu-
ate students, helping behavior differed depending on the degree
to which they experienced empathic concern, and the “ease of
escape” or the cost to the subject for not helping the individual
in distress. It was found that the helping behavior of participants
high in empathic emotion was unaffected by ease of escape, sug-
gesting their motivation was more purely altruistic and focused
on alleviating the distress of the victim. In contrast, partici-
pants motivated to reduce their own distress were more likely
to help when escape was difﬁcult, and less likely to help when
escape was easy. Similarly, with both adults and children, Eisen-
berg et al. (1989) also found that outward expressions of concern
were positively related to prosociality, while personal distress
was not.
In one of the few experimental studies exploring the effects
of witnessing another individual in distress on prosocial behav-
ior (Vaish et al., 2009), children were assigned to either a harm
(witnessed one experimenter destroying or breaking something
of value to another experimenter) or no harm condition (exper-
imenter destroyed or broke an item not of value to the second
experimenter). It was found that children in the harm condition
exhibited more prosocial behavior toward the experimenter in a
subsequent task, and that children’s facial concern in response
to the experimenter in distress correlated with subsequent help-
ing behavior, even without the experimenter exhibiting overt
behavioral cues of distress. This research demonstrates that wit-
nessing another individual in a distressing situation facilitates
helping behavior in young children, and suggests that feeling
concern for the distressed individual may be motivating this
behavior.
With few exceptions (e.g., Vaish et al., 2009), much of the
research in this area is correlational and such ﬁndings do not
allow the conclusion that empathic distress leads to increased
prosocial behavior. Also, as previously mentioned, research in
the past has often not clearly differentiated between the effects
of personal distress and empathic concern. A need exists, there-
fore, for experimental manipulation of emotional experience to
examine, and distinguish between, the effects of personal dis-
tress and empathic concern on prosocial behavior in children.
Further, although some research has explored how empathy is
negatively related to anger or aggression (Strayer and Roberts,
2004) the literature focusesmainly onhowempathymotivates pos-
itive facets of prosocial behavior. We were interested in exploring
not only the positive effects of empathy on prosocial behav-
ior in situations of advantageous inequity (AI) such as sharing
(where the child can choose more resources for themselves, or
to split resources equally between themselves and their partner),
but also the potential mediating effects of empathy on poten-
tial non-prosocial behavior that is often observed in situations
of disadvantageous inequity (DI; Fehr et al., 2008). In situations
of DI, children must decide whether they would like to withhold
resources from their partner to ensure they receive the same num-
ber of resources as themselves, or alternatively they can choose
to deliver the extra resources to their partner. Within the litera-
ture, trials of DI have been referred to as “envy trials” (Fehr et al.,
2008), with children who choose to withhold resources from their
partner to prevent them from receiving more in DI trials believed
to be exhibiting envious behavior. Envy is broadly conceptual-
ized as a painful or resentful emotional experience associated
with longing for, or wanting something that someone else has.
Although the effects of empathy on envy have not been previ-
ously explored, one might predict that empathy could neutralize
any negative or hostile emotions triggered in an inequitable con-
text, thereby decreasing non-prosocial behavior, and encouraging
prosocial behavior.
STUDY 1
In this work, we adapted an approach previously used with adults
to examine how induced emotion affects resource allocation. Bar-
raza andZak (2009) assigned participants towatch either a sadness
inducing video of a father describing his experiences with his ter-
minally ill son, or a neutral control video of a father and son at
the zoo. Participants rated the degree to which they felt differ-
ent emotions after watching the video, and then took part in an
ultimatum game before being asked if they would like to donate
their earnings to charity. Participants who watched the sadness
inducing video later reported higher levels of negative emotion
than those who watched the control video, which corresponded
with more generous donations. Following this approach, we ran-
domly assigned children to watch either a sadness inducing video
of a young girl named Jenny upset that her dog had gone miss-
ing, or a neutral control video of the same girl preparing for
a yard sale. Importantly, some potential limitations of the Bar-
raza and Zak (2009) study were addressed by ensuring the videos
were closely matched across conditions, inducing empathy for the
recipient as opposed to an unrelated stranger, and exploring how
empathy increased prosociality in a variety of resource allocation
situations.
Our goal was to explore whether inducing a negative emo-
tion, leading to empathetic distress, increases children’s prosocial
behavior in a choice based resource allocation task. We asked chil-
dren to rate their own emotion, as well as Jenny’s emotion to
ensure that the emotion induction was inducing empathic dis-
tress, and also to explore if prosocial behavior was more strongly
tied to either the empathic concern or personal distress aspect
of empathy. The resource allocation task was chosen in order
to explore the effects of empathic distress across both AI and
DI decisions. Five and 6-year-old children participated in the
resource allocation task, drawn from previous research by Fehr
et al. (2008) and Moore (2009), which explored pre-school, and
early school aged children’s behavior in sharing, prosocial, (AI)
and envy (DI) trials. Over a series of four repetitions of four
different trial types, children made decisions about how to allo-
cate resources to themselves and a ﬁctional partner (Jenny) by
choosing one of two options. In each trial there was an equal
option (participant and partner both received one sticker) and an
unequal option. In AI trials (one with a cost, and one with no
cost) the unequal option in both trial types beneﬁted the partici-
pant alone, therefore the equal option was the prosocial choice. In
contrast, in DI trials (again, with both a no cost and cost format)
the unequal option delivered a greater beneﬁt to Jenny, render-
ing the unequal option the prosocial choice. For the purpose of
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this study, therefore, envious behavior in DI trials was deﬁned
as making decisions in a way that prevents one’s partner from
receiving a larger reward than the self, or withholding a bene-
ﬁt from one’s partner (e.g., when offered a choice between one
sticker each or one for self and two for partner, the participant
chooses the former option). By not exhibiting envy in DI trials,
one would be exhibiting prosocial behavior. Our hypothesis was
that children who were primed to feel empathy for their partner
would be more likely to deliver a beneﬁt to their partner in AI
trials, and less often withhold a beneﬁt from their partner in DI
trials.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty typically developing, 5 and 6-year old Canadian children
drawn from a predominately white middle-class neighborhood
participated in this study, which was approved by the University’s
research ethics board. Children were randomly assigned to the
emotion induction or control conditions, with 16 males, and 9
females in each group. The emotion induction group ranged in age
from 61 months, 6 days, to 81 months, 29 days (M = 68 months,
24 days). The control group ranged in age from 60months, 6 days,
to 81 months, 25 days (M = 68 months, 26 days).
Emotion induction manipulation
Two videos were constructed for the purposes of this study. Both
videos begin with a young girl, Jenny, playing in the backyard
with her dog. In the emotion induction video, the dog runs
away, and Jenny makes “lost dog” posters, which she hangs
around her neighborhood. Jenny narrates in a sad tone and is
visibly upset. In the control video Jenny is called inside, and
makes and distributes “yard sale” posters for an upcoming yard
sale while narrating in a neutral tone, and maintaining neu-
tral facial expressions. The videos were matched on a number
of pertinent factors: both were roughly 130 s in length, con-
tained similar scenes and scene sequences, and were narrated
according to scripts with almost identical structures and word
counts. The prominent difference between the videos is the nega-
tive emotiondisplayedby theprotagonist in the emotion induction
video.
Procedure
Parental consent was obtained for each participant prior to test-
ing. All children were tested in the laboratory in a session lasting
roughly 20–25 min. The session included two phases: emotion
induction followed by a resource-allocation task.
Emotion induction. Children sat in front of a 15-inch computer
screen. The experimenter then brieﬂy introduced the video’s con-
tent. Children were asked to focus on how Jenny felt, and how her
story made them feel. They then watched the video.
At the end of the video, children were asked to express how
Jenny felt during the video. Children were then shown the
Facial Affective Scale (FAS; McGrath et al., 1985 as cited in Per-
rott et al., 2004). The FAS is a 9-point measure that includes a
range of happy and sad facial expressions, with a neutral face
at its center point. Children were asked to point to a face that
showed how they felt while viewing the video (emotion rat-
ing for self, providing a measure of personal distress) and a
face that showed how they thought Jenny felt (emotion rating
for Jenny, providing a measure of empathic concern). Poten-
tial scores on the FAS ranged from zero (happiest face) to eight
(saddest face).
Resource-allocation task. This task adopted the method used by
Fehr et al. (2008) and Moore (2009). The task consisted of 17 tri-
als; one practice trial in which children could choose one or two
stickers for themselves (demonstrating the format of the task), fol-
lowed by four repetitions of each test trial, which offered the child
a forced choice between two alterative distributions of stickers.
AI and DI trials were blocked and counterbalanced with blocks
separated by a distracter task (coloring a picture). In AI no cost
trials, children chose between the allocation (1, 1) and (1, 0) – (one
sticker for themselves and one for Jenny or one for themselves and
none for Jenny). InAI cost trials, children chose between (1, 1) and
(2, 0), in DI no cost trials, between (1, 1) and (1, 2), and in DI cost
trials between (1, 1) and (2, 3). In all trials, the experimenter pre-
sented the choices by asking,“Would you like one sticker for yourself
and one sticker for Jenny or would you like {x} sticker(s) for yourself
and {x} sticker(s) for Jenny?” Upon completion, children in the
emotion induction condition were told that Jenny’s dog returned
home in order to neutralize any feelings of sadness.
RESULTS
Manipulation check
To ensure the emotion induction video was producing the desired
effect, FAS scores for Jenny and self were compared across con-
ditions (see Figure 1 for mean scores). Independent samples
t-tests showed that children in the emotion induction condi-
tion rated both Jenny’s and their own emotion as more negative
than those in the control group (Jenny’s emotion, t(48) = 12.21,
p < 0.01; own emotion t(48) = 3.11, p < 0.01). The mean score
for Jenny’s emotion was 6.92 (SD = 1.18) in the emotion induc-
tion group and 1.6 (SD = 1.8) in the control group, while the
mean score for own emotion was 3.96 (SD = 2.5) in the emo-
tion induction group and 1.96 (SD = 2.0) in the control group.
FIGURE 1 | Mean ratings for Jenny and self on the Facial Affective
Scale (FAS), with standard error bars, for the emotion induction and
control group in study one (5–6 year-olds). Possible scores ranged from
“0” (very happy) to “8” (very sad).
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The differences between groups in both self-reported emotion,
and perceptions of Jenny’s emotion show that the manipula-
tion was successful, and empathy was induced by the emotion
induction video. Further, a Pearson correlation between rat-
ings for Jenny and self-showed a strong positive relationship,
r = 0.529, p < 0.01, demonstrating that children who rated
Jenny’s emotion as negative also rated their own emotion more
negatively.
Main analysis
Children received one point for each prosocial choice made in the
resource allocation task. A preliminary analysis of performance on
cost versus no cost trials showed no difference between these trials
so they were pooled for subsequent analysis (No cost mean= 4.68,
SD = 2.02; Cost mean = 4.30, SD = 2.08). For sharing trials,
prosocial responses were (1, 1) choices; for envy trials, prosocial
responses were choices in which the partner received more than
the self. Children thereby received a score ranging from “0” to “8”
for each trial type (see Figure 2 for mean scores).
A 2 × 2 mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with trial
type (AI vs. DI) as the within subjects factor, and condition
(emotion induction vs. control) as the between subjects factor
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of condition,F(1,48)= 4.074, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.078, with children making overall more prosocial alloca-
tions in the emotion induction condition (M = 10.00, SD = 3.32)
compared to the control (M = 7.96, SD = 3.80). A main effect
of trial type, F(1,48) = 5.995, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.111 was also
observed, with children making more prosocial allocations in AI
trials, as opposed to DI trials. No interaction between trial type
and condition, F(1,48) = 0.062, p = 0.804, η2p = 0.001, was
observed.
Finally, to examine associations amongprosocial decisions, per-
sonal distress, and empathic concern, bivariate and subsequent
partial correlational analyses were conducted. An initial bivariate
correlational analysis showed that while there was no relationship
betweenprosocial decisions and emotion ratings for self, r = 0.079,
p = 0.588, there was a signiﬁcant relation between prosocial deci-
sions and ratings of Jenny’s emotional state, r = 0.388, p = 0.005.
FIGURE 2 | Mean prosocial choices on the resource allocation task
with standard error bars, for the emotion induction, and control group,
in AI and DI trials in study one (5–6 year-olds). Possible scores ranged
from “0” (no prosocial behavior) to “8” (consistent prosocial behavior).
When controlling for rating of Jenny’s emotion there was no rela-
tion between overall prosociality and personal distress (emotional
ratings for self), r = −0.062, p = 0.266. However, when control-
ling for emotion ratings for self, the signiﬁcant relation between
prosociality and empathic concern (ratings of Jenny’s emotional
state), r = 0.409, p = 0.003, remained.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study was to explore experimentally the
effects of empathic distress on resource allocation in children.
Following work with adults by Barraza and Zak (2009), we pre-
dicted that childrenwould exhibitmore prosocial behavior toward
a protagonist when they were primed by a movie showing the
protagonist in distress than when the prime was a neutral movie
involving the protagonist. Speciﬁcally, we predicted that children
in the emotion induction condition (who were primed to expe-
rience empathy for their sharing partner) would share more in
AI trials, and exhibit less envy in DI trials, thereby showing more
generosity in both kinds of trials.
A signiﬁcant effect of condition in the resource allocation task
demonstrated that as hypothesized, children in the emotion induc-
tion condition exhibited more prosocial behavior. Children who
had been primed with the emotion induction movie shared more
in AI trials (more often delivering a beneﬁt), and exhibited less
envious behavior in DI trials (less often withholding a beneﬁt),
than children in the control condition. Although there was a
main effect of trial type with more prosocial behavior in AI tri-
als compared to DI trials, this effect may well reﬂect the near
ceiling response rate in AI trials with no cost to self (the only
trial type in which delivering an equitable amount of resources
to Jenny was both prosocial, and at no cost to oneself). Sig-
niﬁcantly, there was no interaction between condition and trial
type.
The effect of emotion induction on prosociality appeared to be
unaffected by type of decision (AI vs. DI). In other words, the pos-
itive effects of the emotion induction on prosocial behavior seems
to be consistent across all trial types; having both a positive impact
in AI trials – leading to increases in sharing behavior – as well as a
neutralizing effect, or negative impact on non-prosocial behavior
and consequently producing a decrease in envious behavior in DI
trials.
It was important to verify that the specially constructed videos
did elicit differences in empathy. Our manipulation check showed
that indeed children who watched the emotion induction video
reported feeling sadder themselves (evidence of personal distress)
and also rated the protagonists emotional state more negatively in
comparison to children who viewed the control video (evidence
of empathic concern). The relationship between FAS ratings for
own emotion, and Jenny’s emotion provide further support that
the emotion induction video did elicit empathy, however, the
ﬁnding that prosociality was correlated with ratings of Jenny’s
emotional state, but not with emotional ratings for self suggests
that empathic concern more so than personal distress was driv-
ing decision making. Despite showing an elevated level of distress
after watching the emotion induction video compared to the con-
trol video, children’s own level of distress was not signiﬁcantly
related to resource allocation. In contrast, their rating of the
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protagonist’s distress was. Previous research has also found that
personal distress and outward expressions of empathic concern
differ in terms of their relation to prosociality – speciﬁcally that
prosocial intentions and behavior are linked to empathic concern,
but not personal distress (e.g., Batson et al., 1981; Eisenberg et al.,
1989).
STUDY 2
The results of study one demonstrated that experiencing empathy
for another individual increased subsequent prosocial behavior
toward them in children of 5–6 years of age. As a next step, we were
interested in exploring whether younger children would show a
similar effect. It has been argued that earlier in development, there
is a less clear differentiation of personal distress and empathic con-
cern (e.g., Hoffman, 1975, 1982) in situations in which children
observe another person in distress. According to Hoffman’s the-
ory, it is around 2–3 years of age that children begin to understand
that others have thoughts and feelings different from their own.
To explore whether empathy also increases prosocial behavior in
younger children, and also whether this potential relationship is
linked to personal distress or empathic concern, study one was
replicated with 3-year-old children, which is the youngest age
for which the task demands of the resource allocation task are
appropriate. Pilot testing revealed that 3-year-olds had a difﬁcult
time understanding the DI trials, and therefore these trials were
excluded.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty typically developing, 3-year old Canadian children were
drawn from a predominately white middle-class neighborhood
and randomly assigned to the emotion induction or control con-
ditions. Like the 5–6 year-olds, there were 16 males, and 9 females
in each group. The emotion induction group ranged in age from
36 months to 47 months and 28 days (M = 43 months, 17 days).
The control group ranged in age from 36 months and 1 day to
47 months, 30 days (M = 43 months, 10 days).
Procedure
The protocol was identical to study one, with one exception. In
this study, the DI trials were excluded from the resource allocation
task as some younger children struggled with these trial types.
Therefore the 3-year-olds participated in a total of eight trials;
four AI with cost, and four AI with no cost.
RESULTS: STUDY 2
Manipulation check
To assess the effectiveness of the emotion induction video FAS
scores for Jenny and self were compared across conditions
(see Figure 3 for mean scores). Independent samples t-tests
showed that children in the emotion induction condition rated
Jenny’s emotion more negatively than children in the control,
t(48) = 9.464, p < 0.01. In contrast to the 5–6 year-olds,
no difference between ratings for own emotion was observed,
t(48) = 0.973, p > 0.05. The mean score for Jenny’s emotion
was 6.24 (SD = 1.27) in the emotion induction group and 1.56
(SD = 2.12) in the control group, while the mean score for own
FIGURE 3 | Mean ratings for Jenny and self on the FAS, with standard
error bars, for the emotion induction and control group in study two
(3-year-olds). Possible scores ranged from “0” (very happy) to “8” (very
sad).
emotion was 2.36 (SD = 2.77) in the emotion induction group
and 1.68 (SD = 2.13) in the control group.
Unlike the older children, a Pearson correlation showed no
relationship, r = 0.153, p > 0.05, between emotion ratings for
Jenny and self.
Main analysis
Children received one point for each prosocial choice made in the
resource allocation task (1, 1 in both AI trials). Children thereby
received a score ranging from “0” to “4” for each trial type, and an
overall prosocial score ranging from “0” to “8” (see Figure 4 for
mean scores).
A 2 × 2 mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with trial
type (cost vs. no cost) as the within subjects factor, and con-
dition (emotion induction vs. control) as the between subjects
factor revealed a signiﬁcant effect of condition, F(1,48) = 6.869,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.125, with children making overall more proso-
cial allocations in the emotion induction condition (M = 4.8,
SD = 2.06) compared to the control (M = 3.2, SD = 2.0). A
FIGURE 4 | Mean prosocial choices on the resource allocation task
with standard error bars, for the emotion induction, and control group,
in AI trials in study two (3-year-olds). Scores in cost and no cost trials
were pooled into one overall prosocial score, and possible scores ranged
from “0” (no prosocial behavior) to “8” (consistent prosocial behavior).
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main effect of cost, F(1,48) = 34.505, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.418 was
also observed, with children making more prosocial allocations
in no cost trials (M = 2.5, SD = 1.31), as opposed to cost trials
(M = 1.5, SD = 1.2). No interaction between cost and condition,
F(1,48) = 0.129, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.003, was observed.
Finally, correlations between prosocial decisions, and emotion
ratings for self, as well as Jenny, were conducted. In contrast to
the older children there was no strong relation between overall
prosociality and emotion ratings for self, r = 0.074, p = 0.609,
or Jenny, r = 0.179, p = 0.215. Further, no relationships were
observed between self-reported emotion and prosociality when
controlling for ratings of Jenny’s emotion, r = 0.048, p = 0.742
or between prosociality and ratings of Jenny’s emotional state,
r = 0.170, p = 0.244 when controlling for rating’s of one’s own
emotion.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of study two was to explore whether the positive
effects of empathyonprosociality extended to a younger age group,
and whether the effects were more closely tied to personal distress
or the empathic concern component of empathy. It was hypoth-
esized that empathy would increase prosociality in 3-year-olds,
as it did with 5–6 year-olds, but what was of particular inter-
est was whether personal distress would be a stronger inﬂuence
in younger children, who may be less able to distinguish their
own emotions from those of another individual in distress. The
method from study one was slightly modiﬁed to accommodate
the younger children, as the DI trials were found to be difﬁcult for
them to understand, and were therefore excluded.
Consistent with study one, an effect of condition was observed
with 3-year-olds making more prosocial allocations in compari-
son to children in the control group. This ﬁnding supports the
hypothesis that empathy leads to increased prosocial behavior in
young, 3-year-old children (at least in AI trials) in addition to
older, school aged children.
Explorations of how 3-year-olds rated Jenny’s emotion showed
that our experimentalmanipulationproducedgroupdifferences in
empathic concern, as children in the emotion induction condition
rated Jenny as feeling sadder than children in the control. However,
no differences in self-rated emotion were found between groups.
It could be the case that younger children are just not as skilled at
recognizing or articulating how they themselves feel in response to
witnessing another in a distressing situation, which is perhaps the
most likely explanation. These difﬁculties in using self-reportmea-
sures with young children have been recognized in the literature
(Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990). Difﬁculty comprehending self-report
questions, as well as accurately identifying one’s own emo-
tional state, and differentiating between closely related emotional
states, have been identiﬁed as concerns to be aware of with this
population. However, it could simply be the case that our manip-
ulation was not successful in inducing personal distress in younger
children.
Finally, correlational analyses showed that prosociality was cor-
related with neither ratings of Jenny’s emotion nor ratings of own
emotion. One potential contributor to this discrepancy with ﬁnd-
ings for the older children could be a lack of power, as 5–6 year
olds participated in double the number of trials (both AI and DI,
as opposed to AI alone). Alternatively, if younger children are
less able to accurately identify, or verbalize their own, and others’
emotions as previously suggested, this inability could also be con-
tributing to the null ﬁnding. Including a measure of facial distress
would be useful to include in subsequent research with this age
group, to more accurately gage personal distress if it is suspected
that 3-year-old children are too young to accurately express their
own emotions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current studies explored the relationship between empa-
thy and prosocial behavior in children. It was hypothesized
that experiencing empathy toward one’s partner would both
increase prosocial behavior, and decrease non-prosocial behav-
ior. As hypothesized, both 5–6 year-olds, and 3-year-olds showed
increased prosocial behavior, and 5–6 year-olds showed decreased
non-prosocial behavior toward their partner, if they had ﬁrst been
primed to feel empathy for them. It is important to note that the
induced emotion in these experiments was negative, and more
speciﬁcally, sadness. Empathic experiences of other emotions, or
psychological, or physical states in others, such as happiness, fear,
pain, etc.,may not inﬂuence prosociality in the sameway, although
it is worth exploring how empathic experiences of other negative
emotions or states, as well as positive emotions or states, inﬂuence
prosociality.
As the stimulus videos were created for the purpose of this
research, it was important to validate their effectiveness. The fact
that children in both studies rated the character as sadder after
watching the emotion inducing video than after watching the neu-
tral videoprovides important validation for the emotion induction
manipulation.
Also of interest was whether personal distress or empathic
concern could be speciﬁcally linked to increases in prosociality.
Though the condition effect was consistent across age groups,
differences in self-reports of own emotion, and the relationship
between prosociality and empathic concern differed between stud-
ies one and two. Speciﬁcally, in study one, group differences were
observed for both personal distress, and empathic concern, and
prosociality was correlated with empathic concern (but not per-
sonal distress) in 5–6 year-old children. This ﬁnding is in line with
previous research (e.g., Batson et al., 1981; Eisenberg et al., 1989)
suggesting that an outward orientation of empathic concern is
related to prosociality, whereas personal distress is not.
In contrast, in experiment two there was no group difference
observed in self-rated emotions, and neither personal distress or
empathic concern were correlated with prosocial behavior for the
3-year-olds. These differences across age groups could reﬂect the
inability of younger children to accurately reﬂect on their own
emotion, as well as the methodological differences between exper-
iments. As children behaved differently following exposure to
the emotion induction vs. control video, and the videos pro-
duced group differences in reports of both personal distress and
empathic concern – with the exception of personal distress in
3-year-olds – we feel conﬁdent that the videos were effective in
inducing empathy in both experiments.
Overall, our experiments support the ﬁndings of Barraza and
Zak (2009) that experiencing empathy for sadness leads to more
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prosocial behavior, and extends this ﬁnding to children across two
distinct age groups. Although similar in concept, it is important to
note that our studies differ from Barraza and Zak’s (2009) study
in a number of ways. First, our videos were closely matched across
conditions. Participants both saw a little girl named Jenny playing
withher dog,makingposters, andhanging themaroundherneigh-
borhood. They heard her narrate the video, which was matched
for factors such as word count, and length. The primary difference
between videos was the negative emotion Jenny portrayed in the
emotion induction video. Further, the use of the Resource Allo-
cation task allowed for multiple trials, and an exploration of the
effects of empathy on both AI and DI trial types so the poten-
tial of empathy to reduce non-prosocial behavior could also be
examined in 5–6 year-olds. Finally, in this study the partner with
whom participants shared was the individual toward whom they
were primed to feel empathy, as opposed to an unrelated part-
ner. Whether empathic concern for sadness toward one person
would lead children to behave more prosocially with an unre-
lated partner is unknown at this point and is a question for future
research.
It may be noted that our measures of empathy were both self-
report and so might be open to concerns about validity. However,
similar (verbal) self-report approaches have been commonly used
in related research (e.g., Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Eisenberg et al.,
1996; Strayer and Roberts, 1997). Importantly, we found that
5–6 year old children’s attribution of emotion to a partner in a
distressing situation predicted sharing behavior with this individ-
ual, thereby providing some validation of the usefulness of this
self-report measure.
In both experiments, children were ﬁrst asked to identify how
Jenny felt, and then to express how they themselves felt. As ratings
of Jenny’s emotion were obtained ﬁrst, this measure was unaf-
fected by how children may have felt themselves. Recall ratings of
Jenny’s emotion differed across groups in both experiments, and
were correlated with prosociality in experiment 1. Ratings for par-
ticipants’ own emotion were collected subsequently, allowing all
children to ﬁrst reﬂect on how Jenny felt before communicating
their own emotional state. These ratings of own emotion were not
correlated with prosociality, and did not differ between groups in
experiment two. Although it is unlikely that the order in which
the questions were asked inﬂuenced the results (especially since it
would be the second question inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst which does
not seem to be the case), it is worthmentioning that further explo-
rations may beneﬁt from counterbalancing the order of these two
questions.
Although the relation between empathy and sympathy and
prosocial behavior has been explored in earlier work (e.g., Eisen-
berg et al., 1988; Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow, 1990), this is
the ﬁrst experimental demonstration to our knowledge of empa-
thy for sadness, and speciﬁcally empathic concern being shown to
inﬂuence resource allocation in young children. Furthermore, our
results suggest empathic concern for sadness can promote shar-
ing, but perhaps the most novel contribution of this work is the
ﬁnding that it also has a counteracting, or neutralizing effect on
the negative consequences of envy.
In sum, these experiments show that empathic concern for sad-
ness does lead to prosocial resource allocation in young children
both by promoting sharing and decreasing envy. Understand-
ing the development of prosocial behavior is important in many
regards. Prosocial development is both important in creating and
sustaining personal relationships, and on a larger scale, a critical
component in maintaining a functioning society. By understand-
ing the mechanisms such as empathy, that inﬂuence prosocial
behavior, we can better support and encourage the development
of prosocial behaviors such as sharing, and learn how to inhibit
or neutralize more negative aspects of social behavior such as
envy.
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